participation in international division of labour, thereby overcoming balance-of-payments problems and accelerating technical progress and economic growth, to catch up with industrialized countries.
At the same time as developing countries strived hard to integrate more closely into the world economy, a new trade round was transforming the global playing field.
The Uruguay Round Agreements were expected to be doubly favourable to developing countries. On the one hand, a strong rules-based system would benefit smaller and poorer economies by subjecting the conduct of their major trading partners to greater transparency and discipline, and putting in place a system of reviews and sanctions which could not be subverted by powerful vested interests. On the other hand, a more open trading environment was expected to strengthen the growth prospects of developing countries by pushing their producers to the efficiency frontier and improving their access to markets in the North. The optimism was reflected in extravagant predictions made regarding the gains the developing countries would reap from the Uruguay Round.
Indeed, during the past two decades developing countries have become major players in world trade. Their exports have grown faster than the world average and now account for about one third of world merchandise trade, rising from less than one fourth in the 1970s. During this period, developing countries also became important markets for each others products: the share of trade among them reached 40 per cent of their total exports at the end of the millennium.
Much of the growth in the exports of developing countries has been in manufactures, which today account for over 70 per cent of their total exports, after hovering around 20 per cent during much of the 1970s and early 1980s. The share of developing countries in world manufactured exports now exceeds 25 per cent, compared to some 10 per cent in the 1970s.
More important, many developing countries appear to have succeeded in moving into technology-intensive manufactured exports, which have been among the most rapidly growing products in world trade over the past two decades. For some products such as transistors and conductors, computers and office machines, and electric power machinery, developing country exports now account for between 40 and 50 per cent of total world exports. Much of this expansion has taken place as a result of their growing participation in international production networks (IPNs) whereby production chains are split up and located in different countries by transnational corporations (TNCs) seeking low-cost producers for export to world markets.
B. Trade and industrialization
However, on closer examination, the picture is much more nuanced and less sanguine. The success of developing countries in expanding their manufacturing exports and attracting export-oriented FDI has not always been accompanied by faster growth in their gross domestic product (GDP). At some 4.8 per cent per annum, the average growth rate in developing countries during the 1990s was well below the average of 5.7 per cent achieved during the 1970s. If China is excluded, the decline is much more pronounced, almost close to two percentage points.
Most countries which shifted from inward-oriented to outward-oriented development through a rapid liberalization of imports and FDI, particularly in Latin America, have not shared in the expansion of manufactured exports, but have experienced surges in imports and mounting trade deficits, resulting in increased dependence on private capital inflows for growth. On the other hand, attempts to attract private finance through capital account liberalization have made matters worse by generating boom-bust cycles in financial markets and misalignments and gyrations in exchange rates, undermining productive investment, particularly in the traded goods sectors.
Much of the expansion in manufactured exports of developing countries has concentrated in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, Central America. However, with the exception of a few East Asian first-tier newly industrializing economies (NIEs), mainly
Korea and Taiwan, which have already reached income levels as high as some industrialized countries, the exports of developing countries are still concentrated on products derived essentially from the exploitation of natural resources and the use of unskilled or semi-skilled labour which have limited prospects for productivity growth and lack dynamism in world markets.
Trade statistics showing a rapid expansion of technology-intensive, high valueadded exports from developing countries are misleading, because of double-counting of trade among countries linked through IPNs. Such products appear to be exported by developing countries, but in reality those countries are often involved only in the lowskill, assembly stages of production, using technology-intensive parts and components imported from more advanced countries. As trade flows are measured in gross-value rather than value-added, imported parts and components are counted among the exports of the countries assembling them. Consequently, although developing countries appear to have become major players in world markets for supply-dynamic, high-tech products, they still account only for 10 per cent of world exports of products which score high in R&D content, technological complexity and/or economies of scale.
In the past two decades the increased mobility of capital, together with continued restrictions over labour movements and various incentives provided by the recipients of FDI, has extended the reach of IPNs particularly in three sectors: clothing, the automotive industry and electronics. Trade based on specialization within such networks is estimated to account for up to 30 per cent of world exports. In the clothing sector although FDI has played some role, the major form of production relocation is subcontracting to domestic enterprises. The electronics industry is the most globalized of all industries, and trade in electronics products is underpinned by an increasing geographical dispersion of TNC-driven production networks. Relocation of production in the automobile sector is constrained by physical distance to the final market, and is greatly influenced by preferential regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA and Mercosur.
Almost three quarters of the increase in the share of developing countries in world manufacturing exports have taken place in the three sectors in which IPNs have expanded rapidly in recent years. In these networks, notably in electronics and the automotive industries, most of the technology and skills are embodied in imported parts and components, and much of the value-added accrues to producers in more advanced countries where these parts and components are produced, and to the TNCs involved.
The share of developing countries in value-added is determined by the cost of the least scarce and weakest factor, namely unskilled and semi-skilled labour, whereas the rewards to scarce but internationally mobile factors such as capital, management and know-how are reaped by their foreign owners. It is in effect the labour itself, rather than the product of labour, that is exported.
Consequently, while the share of developing countries in world manufacturing exports, including high-tech products, appears to have been expanding rapidly, incomes earned from such activities by these countries do not share in this dynamism. On this score, a comparison between the developed and developing countries over the past two decades is highly revealing. Although the share of developed countries in world manufactured exports fell from more than 80 per cent to about 70 per cent between 1980 and the end of the 1990s, they actually increased their share in world manufacturing value-added in the same period. In these countries, manufacturing value-added has consistently exceeded manufactured exports over the past two decades.
Developing countries, by contrast, have achieved a steeply rising ratio of manufactured exports to GDP, but without a significant upward trend in the ratio of manufacturing value-added to GDP. In the major exporters of manufactures in the South, export values have constantly exceeded manufacturing value-added during the past two decades, and the gap has increased further as exports have grown faster. Thus, the increase in the share of developing countries in world manufacturing exports has not been accompanied by a concomitant increase in their shares in world manufacturing valueadded.
These comparisons relate to value-added generated in developed and developing countries, rather than incomes earned from manufacturing activities. The value-added left in developing countries is smaller and the income earned by industrial countries is larger if account is taken of profits earned by TNCs on their investment in developing countries.
C. A stylized picture of diversity in trade and industrial development
This general picture no doubt hides diversity among developing countries in their experience regarding trade and industrialization over the past two decades. In this respect, it is possible to distinguish among four categories: With the notable exception of the first-tier NIEs, therefore, recent expansion in manufacturing exports of developing countries has generally been associated with their increased participation in IPNs, and generated a much more modest growth in manufacturing value-added in these countries. As a result, developing countries appear to be a lot more successful when their performance is measured in terms of manufacturing trade than in terms of manufacturing value-added and income.
Indeed the contrast between the two measures becomes even more evident when a comparison is made between the structures of trade and industrial output, using five broad categories of products: primary commodities, labour and resource-based manufactures, and low, medium and high technology-intensive manufactures. Such a comparison shows that developing countries are becoming increasingly similar to developed countries in the structure of their manufactured exports, but not in the structure of their manufacturing value-added and incomes. But, again, there is diversity:
$ Korea and Taiwan stand out for having reached a manufacturing value-added structure that is by far the closest to that prevailing in the leading developed countries. In these countries productivity growth over the past two decades has exceeded the growth in the technological leaders in the North, notably the United
States, in almost all sectors of the manufacturing industry.
$
The manufactured export structure of a large number of developing countries extensively participating in IPNs, including China, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and Singapore, has also begun to resemble that of the major developed countries, but the similarity is much less so for the structure of their manufacturing value-added. In most of these countries, including Malaysia, productivity growth has been faster than in the United States in the lower end of manufacturing but not in the upper end.
$ For the majority of Latin American countries, not only the structure of manufacturing value-added but also that of exports is much less similar to those in the more advanced industrial countries. In many of these countries productivity in labour-intensive manufacturing has been falling, and the processing of natural resources continues to dominate production and export activities.
Briefly, taken together, the evidence suggests that among the major developing countries, only the major first-tier NIEs have succeeded in simultaneously upgrading their production and export structures by raising productivity in technology-intensive sectors and closing the gap with the industrial leaders. Many developing countries relying on FDI and TNCs for expansion of industrial production and exports appear to be far behind in upgrading their production structures, but they are more successful than commodity-dependent Latin American economies in moving to manufacturing.
Clearly, participation in the labour-intensive segments of IPNs can yield considerable benefits for countries in the early stages of industrialization and with a great deal of surplus labour. It can enable them to increase employment and per capita income even when value-added generated is low. Furthermore, increased employment of low- These networks allow TNCs a good deal more flexibility in, and control over, their choice of investment locations. Moreover, their productive assets, such as know-how, design and technology, can be locked more tightly inside the firm thanks to barriers of entry that result from the high costs of managing and coordinating such complex units.
The packaged nature of FDI can, in these circumstances, be the cause of a highly skewed distribution of the gains from trade and investment unless local bargaining power can bring a more balanced outcome, as it did for the first-tier NIEs.
However, replicating the success of early industrializers is all the more difficult where such investment is highly mobile: locational advantages are easily won and lost through small cost changes or the emergence of alternative sites, giving rise to the danger of enclave economies where there is a persistently high dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods. These problems can be particularly serious for middleincome countries which have been successful in early stages of industrialization but which now need rapid upgrading and productivity growth in order to advance further along the development path.
An important motive in seeking to attract FDI in export industries is its potential contribution to balance-of-payments. Indeed, as long as the entire production is exported, participation in IPNs can make a positive contribution to the balance-of-payments in developing countries, barring such practices as transfer pricing, even if these activities are heavily dependent on imported parts and components, and the value-added left in the country is no more than the wages of unskilled labour. However, the picture can change when the goods and services produced are sold in domestic markets. More generally, the contribution of FDI to balance-of-payments varies inversely with the share of TNCs profits in value-added, the extent of their reliance on imports, and the proportion of final product sold in domestic markets. In general, since the chunk of the value-added goes to profits, the import content is high, and the goods and services produced are partly sold in domestic markets, the contribution of FDI to balance-of-payments in developing countries is often negative. This is the case even in China, one of the most successful countries in attracting export-oriented FDI. At the end of the 1990s, total profits earned by foreign-funded enterprises (FFE) in China were in the order of $20 billion, of which $12 billion was reinvested in the country and the rest was taken out. In the same period, these enterprises generated a net export surplus of $2 billion. Thus, the FFE sector as a whole was in the red by some $6 billion even on cash-flow basis. Available evidence suggests that a similar situation existed in Malaysia in the late 1980s and early 1990s when such deficits were covered simply by relying on new FDI, in much the same way as engaging in a process of Ponzi financing -that is, servicing debt by incurring new debt.
D. Competition and the fallacy of composition
As a result of the increased participation of several highly populated, low-income countries in world trade in recent years, as much as 70 per cent of the labour force employed in sectors participating in world trade is low-skilled. Besides, there is still a considerable amount of surplus labour in such countries, and many large countries are not yet fully integrated into the international trading system. Thus, a simultaneous export drive by developing countries in labour-intensive manufactures, or increased competition among them to attract FDI as locations for labour-intensive processes, could rekindle the fallacy of composition or the adding-up problem: on its own a small developing country can substantially expand its exports without flooding the market and seriously reducing the prices of the products concerned, but this may not be true for developing countries as a whole, or even for large individual countries such as China and India. The dangers of overproducing standardized mass products with high import dependence are typified by the electronics sector, where developing country export prices appear to be more volatile and to have fallen more steeply after 1995 than similar products traded among developed countries.
There are also more general signs that the prices of manufactured exports from developing countries have been weakening vis-à-vis manufactures exported by industrialized countries in recent years. Evidence shows that productivity gains in resource-based and labour-intensive manufactures exported by developing countries do not always go to labour as higher wages, but often benefit consumers in western markets in lower prices. These trends suggest increased commoditization of many labour- With a growing number of developing countries, including some with very large unskilled labour pools, turning to export-oriented strategies, it is the middle-income countries in Latin America and South-East Asia that appear most vulnerable to these dynamics. In particular, greater price competition in products of the electronics sector appears to have increasingly exposed traditional developing country exporters to the emergence of more competitive suppliers in countries with lower costs. In the absence of a rapid upgrading to high-skill, high value-added manufactures needed to enable them to compete with more advanced industrial countries, these exporters may face a squeeze between the top and bottom ends of the markets for manufactures.
These challenges facing developing countries in international trade have been seen in recent years through the lens of international competitiveness. However, a degree of caution is needed in applying this concept in the present context. In the first place, strictly speaking, the concept may be useful to define the position of individual enterprises vis-à-vis each other, but not for comparisons among economies as a whole or even among industries comprising many firms with different characteristics: for, it is not countries but firms that trade. From a private perspective it may matter little whether the international competitiveness of an enterprise is improved through productivity growth, wage cuts or a devaluation of the currency, but from a broader socio-economic point of view, these have totally different implications for economic growth, and social stability and welfare.
Evidence shows that wage suppression or sharp currency devaluations are not viable responses to the emergence of low-cost producers. Many countries which sought to increase the international competitiveness of their firms in this way have failed to achieve sustained improvements in their manufactured export and value-added performance. On the other hand, while productivity growth is a more secure way of gaining a competitive edge for an individual country, a simultaneous drive by a large number of countries to improve productivity and to gain competitiveness in labourintensive manufactures can create gluts in these products and, hence, run against the problem of fallacy of composition, in much the same way as has happened in a number of primary commodities.
E. Policy challenges
The basic policy issue facing developing countries in the trading system is not, fundamentally, one of more or less trade liberalization, but how best to extract from their participation in that system the elements that will promote economic development. For some this is still a matter of switching from primary commodities, but for many others it and a process of benign de-industrialization starts at much higher income and productivity levels than those achieved by middle-income countries; that is, at around $9.000. Indeed a problem facing many developing countries today is that deindustrialization has been occurring and the share of services rising at levels of industrial productivity and per capita income that are much lower than in industrialized economies. More important, this has been happening in the context of erratic and slow growth. It would be a fallacy to think that middle-income countries could converge towards the income levels of highly industrialized countries by simply rapidly moving into services, before achieving industrial maturity.
Similarly, the limits of services in providing new trade opportunities would need to be recognized. A number of services, particularly those related to data processing, have been moving to middle-income developing countries with well-educated populations. However, the pros and cons of this are very much like those entailed by participation in IPNs. These countries have a competitive edge in such services because their wages are lower than those in industrialized countries; that is, because they are lessdeveloped. But low wages have very little to do with the efficiency of labour in the services performed. A data analyst or a doctor in Kuala Lumpur is not necessarily less skilful or productive than their counterparts in Europe, but he or she earns a much lower wage because the overall productivity of the economy is much lower. And for most countries, there is no other way of raising overall productivity than industrial development.
Finally, to avert potential difficulties in labour-intensive manufactures, larger developing economies, including China and India, will need to find ways of utilizing domestic sources of growth more fully. It is true that growth of manufacturing and industrialization in the first-tier NIEs depended heavily on expansion of exports, particularly at the early stages of their development. However, these countries were poor in natural resources, and this necessitated a rapid move into labour-intensive manufacturing to earn the foreign exchange needed for imports essential for development. Moreover, they were small in size; collectively their population is smaller than that of Guangdong Province in China. Thus, their industries needed to seek markets abroad in order to achieve the necessary economies of scale in production. Indeed, historical evidence demonstrates, in general, an inverse relationship between trade orientation and economic size; among countries with similar levels of per capita income, the ratio of trade to income tends to be lower in countries with larger populations.
Therefore, countries such as China and India can rely less on foreign markets for their industrialization than did the first-tier NIEs. This would provide greater space for smaller newcomers in labour-intensive manufactures.
A strengthening of regional economic ties could also help this process along in East Asia and South America. Conventional economic thinking tends to dismiss regional arrangements as a second-best solution for meeting development goals, and as a potential stumbling-block on the road to a fully open and integrated multilateral system. However, this conclusion is based on a somewhat utopian view of the global economy. Where domestic firms still have weak technological and productive capacities, and the global 20 economic context is characterised by biases and asymmetries, regional arrangements may well provide the most supportive environment in which to pursue national development strategies.
Greater regional economic integration increases the risk that problems in one country may be transmitted to its neighbours. Arguably, that danger has intensified in today`s globalizing world, as was seen in East Asia during 1997-1998. With volatile capital flows fuelling boom-bust cycles, a more fragile macroeconomic context has developed, vulnerable to shifting investor sentiments. Thus, a return to stable and rapid regional growth needs to be underpinned not only by policies directed at the upgrading of production and exports, but also by accompanying regional monetary arrangements and cooperation designed to ensure the stability of financial markets and achieve a stable pattern of intraregional exchange rates.
